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Abstract
In “The Spiritual Illusion” (2014), Jonathan R. Herman wishes to initiate a discussion of 
the feasibility of the category “spirituality” within the study of religions. This response 
addresses several methodological problems with his effort, and questions the feasibility 
of this ironic approach. My critique is five-folded: Firstly, Herman draws a crude picture 
of the relationship between theology and the study of religion. Secondly, he does not 
explain why his sample of authors constitutes a hegemony for the understanding of 
“spirituality” in the study of religions. Thirdly, he ignores those who have been influential 
for how the category is used today. Fourthly, religion is assumed to be a “rectified” cate-
gory not worthy of discussion. Fifthly, it remains unclear where an “ironic” and “imagina-
tive” comparison of spiritual\religion and penis\vagina will take us.
Keywords
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conceptual/semantic history – genealogy – SBNR
The use of the category “spirituality” in the study of religion deserves critical 
review and those who use it should be subjected to “collegial deconstruction” 
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(as we all do). In the MTSR article “The Spiritual Illusion: Constructive Steps 
toward Rectification and Redescription” (2014), Jonathan R. Herman addresses 
the feasibility of the category “spirituality” within the study of religion. He 
problematizes the category “spirituality” by pointing at a series of quotes 
from mostly theological sources. In an effort to “redescribe spirituality” in 
an “ironic and imaginative manner,” Herman compares the religion/spiritual 
distinction with that of penis/vagina. Unfortunately, Herman fails on several 
points at the outset of his rectification and redescription. In fact, he stumbles 
into many of the same traps he sets up for his colleagues and data, including 
theologians.
Firstly, Herman draws a too simple and naive picture of the theologian/
scholar of religion relationship. Secondly, due to a vague methodology, he 
does not explain why an arbitrary sample of theological and popular religion 
authors should have any bearing on the conceptual use of a folk category 
within the study of religion. Thirdly, those who have been influential on how 
the category of spirituality is used within the academy(ic study of religion) 
are not brought into the discussion. Fourthly, “religion” is assumed to be a 
“rectified” category not worthy of further discussion. Fifthly, in the attempt to 
be “ironic” and “imaginative,” the relationship between religion and spiritual-
ity is conceptualized on the basis of unqualified assumptions about religion, 
spirituality and the human “reproductive organs.”
Herman opens his “Spiritual Illusion” by sending Russell T. McCutcheon 
on to the stage.—You shall be suspicious of the dangers of hidden theological 
apologetics, he preaches. Herman deploys McCutcheon to legitimize the kind 
of “collegial deconstruction” he is about to venture into. The message is clear: 
How “spirituality” is generally conceptualized has to do with theological, ego-
centric and religious motivations, a.k.a. stuff we do not fancy within the study 
of religion. After all, we are scholars of religion, but not theologians.
Herman’s agenda is hereby set: the brave critical critic of religion fights 
against the dubious religious apologetic caretaker. The first engages in “legiti-
mate research and scholarship,” the last is likely to produce “biased, incom-
plete or erroneous” scholarship (160). In other words, theologians and other 
religious actors within the academy should be treated as “outsiders” with reli-
gious and\or spiritual motivations behind their scholarly work. They should be 
regarded as “data.” It is not made clear if these illegitimate motivations follow 
from the disciplinary designation or vice versa. While I do think it is necessary 
that we need to employ a hermeneutics of suspicion, also when it comes to our 
colleagues within the academy, I do not think theologians warrant the extra 
suspicion compared to any other disciplinary identities.
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I Missing Theologians
In my work on the conceptual/semantic history of “spirituality” in Norway, 
theologians have proven one of the most relevant sources for understand-
ing how “spirituality” as a concept has been understood since its introduc-
tion into Western history, between the letters of Paul and the fifth century 
letter most likely written by Pelagius, the first source where we find the term 
spiritualitate (Principe 1983: 130). This is because it is within theology you 
are most likely to find those who have bothered with tracing and analyzing 
this history. Scholars of religion have merely dismissed this genealogy as not 
relevant for how the concept is used in the modern period (e.g., Carrette & 
King 2005: 33; Bregman 2006: 8). One of the most comprehensive surveys of 
the category written in English is by the catholic nun Lucy Tinsley in her dis-
sertation French Expressions for Spirituality and Devotion: A Semantic Study 
(1952). To my knowledge, a similar study has not been done since. This goes 
to show that theological motivations have been one of the main forces behind 
the will to systematize and scrutinize our sources to religious thinking in the 
past. A good example is the pioneer in computational linguistics, the Jesuit 
priest Robert Busa, who in the 1940s began working towards the digitaliza-
tion of the complete works of Thomas Aquinas, which was launched as the 
Index Thomisticus in 1974. In many cases, work within theology cannot just 
be dismissed as “data” of dubious religious actors with academic ambitions. 
While we indeed have to reinterpret and redescribe theolotical research to fit 
within the epistemology of the study of religion, we often depend on these 
scholarly contributions.
In the article “Toward defining spirituality” (1983), the theologian Walter 
Principe is clearly restricted by a rather narrow interpretation of Paul, but he 
still offers a three page outline of a conceptual history of spirituality from the 
outset of the Pauline epistles. This is more than any scholar of religion has 
produced till this day. Principe’s article is cited in a matter of fact manner in 
works that comment on the history of “spirituality”, e.g., by Jeremy Carrette 
and Richard King in their Selling Spirituality (2005), but strangely ignored by 
Herman. One would expect Herman to acknowledge the 1.900 year long his-
tory of a concept that for most part fits within Christian thought as part of an 
attempted genealogical rendering of spirituality as a emic folk category with 
theological tendencies. It would in fact have strengthened his case.
My aim is not to be an apologetic of theology, or to shield theologians or 
other colleagues from critical scrutiny or epistemological questioning, but 
to challenge the assumption that academic titles or departmental identity 
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are sufficient to untangle the assumptions, motivations and goals behind the 
use of certain salient categories. While I (obviously) subscribe to the idea of 
“collegial deconstruction,” I find Herman’s attempt disappointing. To begin 
with, it is unclear whom Herman identifies as “a colleague.” We can assume 
that both McCutcheon and Jonathan Z. Smith are deemed colleagues, but 
neither receives any deconstruction. Rather, these are the people, some of 
them not identified, whose statements are “deconstructed”: Popular religion 
writer Karen Armstrong; “a well elderly, well-educated, American Jewish 
man”; a host of unnamed presenters on the IAHR-conference; the theologians 
Philip Sheldrake, Wesley J. Wildman and Amy Hollywood, Ewert Cousin, Paul 
Tillich, Morton Nelle, Alister McGrath, John D. Barbour, Tim Renick; leader-
ship speaker William Guillory; Psychiatrist/Philosopher/Anthropologist Roger 
Walsh; nurse Joni Walton; and educator/author/consultant Duncan Ferguson. 
None of them, as far as I can see, has contributed to the discussion of spiritual-
ity in any of the central journals of our discipline.
The challenges and problems with the term “spirituality” as conceptual-
ized by theologians is not that it is kept “vague.” On the contrary, it is more 
problematic when theologians indeed aims to “reclaim” by arguing its histori-
cal belonging to Christian thought to redefine it within a certain theological 
understanding. They do not usually communicate that the Greek term pneuma 
(translated to the Latin spiritus) is used by Greek philosophers in similar ways 
before the Pauline epistles was authored. Moreover, the idea of human spirit 
and that something can be ascribed to it, predates and goes far beyond the elab-
orate use of it in the Bible. As demonstrated by the linguist Alexandre François 
(2008:184ff), similar semantic connections between the ideas of breath, invis-
ible entities and life principles can be traced in many languages, e.g., the Greek 
pneuma, Russian dux, and the Aleuit anri. If “spirituality” indeed is to be used 
as an analytical and comparative category, we must challenge the notion of 
it being essentially Christian in nature. Take for example the sentiment that 
Sheldrake entertains in his A Brief History of Spirituality (2007: 1, my empha-
sis), “The contemporary use of the word ‘spirituality’ is sometimes vague and 
difficult to define precisely because it is increasingly detached from religious 
traditions and specifically from its roots in Christianity.”
The unclear operational distinction between “colleagues” and “data” aside, 
Herman’s article could potentially have been a valuable contribution to 
the conversation if he had done a better job of explaining why and where a 
bunch of theologians and popular religion writers have any bearing on how 
the emic folk category “spirituality” should be used, understood, rectified and 
(re)described within the study of religion. In other words, besides the implicit 
nods to McCutcheon and Smith, what in Herman’s opinion constitutes 
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a proper, unbiased and clear use of spirituality as an etic category within the 
academic study of religion? In my case, because of this lack of methodological 
clarity, Herman becomes, ironically, “a datum” himself.
II Missing Colleagues
Herman’s assertion that “spirituality” is “scarcely a scholarly category at all” 
(163) is plausible in the sense that the meta-theoretical discussion is scarce in 
proportion to its widespread use within the academic study of religion. It is 
therefore almost suspect that he categorically omits the few who have at least 
raised the issue in our disciplinary journals (e.g., Rose 2010; Huss 2014).1 Why 
not survey the use of the category within the study of religion and its central 
journals? For example, how did Mircea Eliade use the category? Can we not 
assume some hidden apologetics behind his usage of “spiritual” in the article 
“Spirit, truth and seed” (1971), the title of which—by the way—seems to fit the 
comparative framework that Herman concludes his article with? It is hard to 
read Herman’s article as more than a series of missed opportunities.
One would think that there is a plenty of low-hanging fruit within the study 
of religion. Take for example the influential book The Spiritual Revolution 
(2005) by Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead. They relate their use of spiritual-
ity to “express commitment to a deep truth that is to be found within what 
belongs to this world” (6). In fact, you will find a bunch of vague and unde-
fined associations of spirituality in this book, which it also has been criticized 
for (e.g., in Voas & Bruce 2005: 43-4). The use of “spiritual” and “spirituality” 
would easily fit Herman’s interpretation of “vague or jargonistic” (164), but The 
Spiritual Revolution is not mentioned at all.
Even authors that would have supported Herman’s agenda are left out of the 
picture. In the above-mentioned Selling Spirituality, Carrette & King ask: “what 
are the socio-political effects of the decision to classify specific practices or 
philosophies as ‘spiritual’ and who benefits from such constructions?” (4). In 
fact, Carrette & King’s stance towards “spirituality” is very similar to Herman’s. 
Like the latter, they argue that it has become an encoding of Western neo- 
liberal value propositions, “a projection of modern, western, cosmopolitan reli-
giously liberal values” (171). Compare also the following sentences:
1    I included Huss’s article for interested readers. It is not reasonable to imply that Herman 
should have included this, since it was published concurrently.
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There are perhaps few words in the modern English language as vague 
and woolly as the notion of ‘spirituality.’ (Carrette & King 2005: 30)
If there is anything that most purported (or implied) definitions of spiri-
tuality have in common, it is that they tend to be vague or jargonistic, i.e., 
either lacking in specificity or substituting other obscure language that 
may give a misleading impression of specificity. (Herman 2014: 164)
Dave Webster, in the introduction of Dispirited (2012) adds to Carrette & 
King’s assessment that, “[b]y itself, this is not a problem, ‘love’ can be pretty 
hard to define, and that is not enough to have us rejecting that it can mean 
something . . .” (2). Webster even takes the effort of defining what theology is 
(Herman does not): “Theology is the attempt at finding out what it means if 
we accept certain foundational propositions” (3). If one has accepted the bib-
lical rendering of “the spirit” as something given to us from a god with moral 
implications, the implementation details may be as vague and varied as you 
want, but it is pretty clear what they are getting at: an attempt of describ-
ing what the experience of God is. We may not “get” what the definitions are 
“getting at,” but it is not hard to understand the challenge it attempts to resolve. 
Of course, if you simply adopt theological propositions to answer a challenge 
within the study of religion, you are getting into deep waters.
Furthermore, if theologians should count as colleagues\data, why should not 
psychologists? Within psychology, there have been several published studies 
on how spirituality as a emic folk category is understood (e.g., Schlehofer et al. 
2008; la Cour et al. 2012; Keller et al. 2013), and how it should be conceptualized 
as a research category (e.g., Zinnbauer et al. 1997; 1999; Hill et al. 2000; Koenig, 
Harold 2008; Westerink, Herman 2012). The relationship between religion 
and spirituality, which Herman addresses has been broadly discussed in over 
a decade within the psychology of religion, but you will not find Pargament, 
Hill or Koenig mentioned in Herman’s analysis. In the article “Spirituality: 
A glowing and useful term in search for a meaning” (2006), Lucy Bregman has 
done the legwork and refers to a 2002 study by Unruh, Versnel, and Kerr which 
identified 92 definitions in empirical and clinical studies (9). In fact, Bregman 
would be an interesting sparring partner for Herman. She concludes that “spir-
ituality,” “will work for many of us in spite of these drawbacks, in part because 
it fills niches in a changing religious situation” (24).
Herman states, “One need not search very far to find rich and amusing 
examples of how such a folk category may conceal numerous layers of social 
and rhetorical significance” (161). Well, you do not have to search long to 
identify the discussion of spirituality as a scholarly category within the study 
of religion either. While he states that, “many social scientists and  critical 
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theorists in the academic study of religion are inclined to dismiss ‘spirituality’ 
as an illegitimate scholarly category . . .” (162), he does not identify who these 
are. While we all are in constant danger of missing or leaving out something 
that has been said about our field of study, it is strange that a journal which 
emphasizes methodological and theoretical discourse publishes an article that 
ignores most of it. While there may be reasons for a “fresh start,” we should keep 
with the academic ideal of explaining why something is deemed (ir)relevant.
III Missing Methodologies
Herman’s methodological declaration to wipe out “any confusion as to the 
nature of this project” is done by negation: Neither is it a “a genealogical study” 
of the concept, nor a “morphological study,” nor a “survey of all literature and 
social phenomena that self-identify as spiritual“ (163). However, by identifying 
his project as “rectification” and “redescription,” one is left wondering what 
it exactly is that is rectified and redescribed. Can the concept of spirituality 
escape genealogy, morphology and its use as a label for identity? If it can, is a 
detached and seemingly coincidental analysis of theological vague use of the 
concept a useful strategy towards rectification and redescription within the 
study of religion? For example, Herman hastily concludes that William James’ 
“now-creaky, definition of religion“ (167) is “satisfactorily debunked by the 
gamut of theorists from Clifford Geertz to Talal Asad” (168) (some references 
to the inbetweeners would have been interesting). Observing that Asad in fact 
saw it necessary to challenge the concept of religion from a genealogical per-
spective, it is strange that even McCutcheon’s work is not given credit when 
it comes to challenging the category of religion in Herman’s article. Neither 
are prominent critics such as Timothy Fitzgerald (1999) or Daniel Dubuisson 
(2003). In other words, while spirituality is dismissed, religion is portrayed as 
an unproblematic category.
I almost suspect this is deliberate on Herman’s part, but it is a bit ironic 
(in the Morrisettian sense) that an article that criticizes the unwillingness to 
define spirituality does not follow through with its own use of “religion\ous.” 
In Herman’s own words, “most people may be poor informants when it 
comes to describing the specifics of their own religious engagement, but 
their attempts at self-disclosure are more often than not the data that need 
to be contextualized and analyzed” (161). It is perhaps a cheap blow, but 
the article suffers under its lack of describing the specifics. If you actually 
talk with people, you may learn how “spirituality” as an emic folk category 
works. When Margrethe Løøv and I did this, at the largest Mind, Body, Spirit 
fair in Norway in 2012 and 2013, the associations and meanings assigned to 
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“spiritual” by our respondents were not necessarily “vague” at all (Løøv & 
Melvær 2014). As expected you find associations with “abstract concepts” 
such as “energy,” “love,” “openness,” “enlightenment” and “the divine”; but also 
 specific concepts such as “crystals,” “divination,” “ghosts” and “the color purple.” 
With just over fifty respondents, they gathered a list of close to over a hundred 
associations with “spiritual.” While this may just be a measure for its “vague-
ness,” it may be also be noted that within this list you may draw word clusters 
of terms with similar meanings, and there are recurring patterns within the set 
that suggest that it may not be so vague after all. The term “spiritual” as an emic 
folk category (among those who visits these fairs in Norway) refers to certain 
experimental categories (e.g., “happiness”), to ontological structures (e.g., “the 
divine”), to specific activities (e.g., “divination”) or to identities (e.g., “good per-
son”). It is not that Herman is wrong in that the category of spirituality appears 
in book titles and on the internet as if its meaning is self-evident, but he forgets 
that for most other people, it kind of is. Like most words we use.
Herman follows through the vein of “collegial deconstruction” and takes on 
a collection of paper titles at the IAHR congress in Toronto 2010 that mention 
either “spirituality” or ”spiritual” (Herman 2014:162-163). From peeking through 
the collection of abstracts, he concludes that they don’t suggest that these cat-
egories are problematized or put “ironically” (because that’s apparently a thing 
we do now). To put Herman’s methodology to his own work: I cannot find any 
suggestion in his abstract that he will use the category “religion“ in a problema-
tizing or ironical manner, and in fact, he doesn’t in the article either. But let us 
return to the IAHR abstracts.
In the Congress Proceedings of the XXth IAHR World Congress (2010), you 
will find these categories put to use. For example, in a plenary presentation, 
professor Catherine L. Albanese claims that, “Channelled theologies address 
some of the most acute spiritual problems of our times . . .” and that “chan-
neled worlds fan out into a larger, more accessible new spirituality” (151). No 
hints of a problematizing approach there. The abstract of the paper on “African 
Spirituality” does not address the challenges of defining neither “spiritual-
ity,” nor “African.” On the other hand, you find several examples of this now 
salient category being used within quotation marks, which do hint to a certain 
degree of meta-theoretical reflexivity. But also more explicitly, for example 
(my emphasis added): “the narrative construction of the categories ‘religion,’ 
‘spirituality’ and ‘esotericism’ ” (Miczek in Wiebe 2010: 323); “Our use of spiri-
tuality in this paper will be painstakingly explicated“ (Boniface in Wiebe 2010: 
346); and “. . . issues of religiosity/spirituality, terms which have generally been 
used interchangeably” (Ramsay in Wiebe 2010: 368). Although I suspect that 
Herman is right in assuming that these categories are used uncritically by 
 9A Response | doi 10.1163/15700682-12341350
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion (2015) 1-14
many, I do not accept his standard model of assuming that they then are used 
in a “theological” or a “speculative” way.
Several of these aforementioned titles and abstracts can be identified as 
belonging to the study of new religious movements/New Age/esotericism. 
More often than not, I suspect, can the use of “spirituality” be traced to be 
some flavor of the definition offered by Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead in 
The Spiritual Revolution (2005: 6-7). They are also partly responsible for the 
frequent distinction and dichotomization between spirituality and religion/
religiosity found within the study of religion. But, again, they did not earn their 
spot as colleagues to be deconstructed by Herman.
Herman identifies three main problems with how spirituality is used within 
his arbitrary sample (164-7). First, it is vaguely defined. He substantiates this 
anecdotally by drawing on an earlier version of the Wikipedia entry “spiritual-
ity.” He states that the definition is replicated on “thousands of websites” (164), 
which it in fact is. This is actually the most insightful part of his article. Herman 
traces the quote to the World Spirituality series and Philip Sheldrake’s A Brief 
History of Spirituality (2007). It is interesting that these books seem to have 
had such a huge impact on how spirituality is represented on the web. One 
is left to wonder why such “vague” and “jargonistic” definition enjoys such a 
broad appeal. Maybe they make some kind of sense to people after all? The 
broad reception of the definition offered by Wikipedia would be an interesting 
case study of itself. Is conceptual vagueness the best explanation for its broad 
spread, or is it something else? And if it is, what is the appeal with vagueness, 
and what does it tell us about our object of study?
Additionally, if you actually flip the covers of some handful of the books 
Herman refers to, you will find efforts to define and describe what is meant by 
“spirituality.” You do not even need to have the physical copies of the books to 
discover this; using amazon.com’s Look inside feature will suffice. Let me be the 
devil’s advocate: Those efforts may not necessarily follow the McCutcheonean 
geneaological paradigm, but should they? Does Herman’s sample of authors 
claim to have the definite operational definition of spirituality that should be 
used in all matters? I could not find these claims. Perhaps scholars of religion 
have uncritically adopted them? Herman does not know, nor do I, because this 
study has not been done yet.
IV Missing Clarity
While Herman criticizes other authors for not defining spirituality in a proper 
manner, he himself fails to define his own analytical categories sufficiently. 
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What constitutes “vague,” “essentialist,” “vane,” “narcissist,” and “evasive” 
concepts? If we are to assume these descriptions to be self-explanatory, why 
does it not extend to “spiritual”? In fact, Herman proves that the broad use 
of spirituality is not that hard to pin down after all, witness his “four specific 
qualities” of spirituality (167-172): (1) It tends to be directed to the individual; 
(2) It is focused on the interiority; (3) It is a private affair; and (4) it involves a 
broad conception of the divine and\or the transcendental. These four identifiers, 
here ironically elaborated from William James’s definition of religion, would 
be a useful heuristic for identifying what is generally meant by spirituality.
This also proves to show the complexity of the role certain categories play 
within the study of religion. They can be understood as categories, as identities, 
as phenomena, as codifications and as terms. The categorization of categories, 
however, comes with different scholarly expectations and analytical boundar-
ies. As “categories” we deal with the whole complexity of the term at once, and 
try to deem which roles it has played within and between discourses. Such as I 
try to do here, and what Herman wants to achieve in his article. As “identities” 
we investigate how categories signal commitments to certain ideas and groups, 
and the (lack of) negotiation of these labels, e.g., the SBNR-label. “Spirituality” 
as a phenomenon is perhaps what is usually found within the theological and 
psychological disciplines. It may make sense within a study of religion frame-
work to pinpoint the people’s explicit or implicit efforts motivate a lifestyle 
to get closer to a representation of transcendence (however it may be con-
ceptualized). It may be useful to discern this from the more general category 
of “religiosity,” without drawing a dichotomy between it and “spiritual.” One 
can also take the McCutcheonian route and analyze “spirituality” as a codi-
fication of certain ideologies or values, as seen in Carrette & King (2005) or 
David Webster’s Dispirited (2011). Lastly, “spirituality” can also be understood 
as a placeholder for a subset of terms, which through a genealogical approach 
can be used to investigate the history of religion. If we can assume a genea-
logical link between the Hebraic ruach, the Greek pneuma|tikos and the Latin 
spirit|us/alitias and the English spiritual/spirituality, it can be fruitful to inves-
tigate the historical specificities that are involved in this development.
The Western genealogy of spirituality takes us to Herman’s second problem. 
The category “is frequently assumed to be a universal quality and it is brought to 
contexts where the concept simply does not apply . . .” (166). As Carrette & King 
and Webster spend almost the whole of their books to point out,  “spirituality” 
has been used to repackage practices and beliefs from other-than-Western 
religions and presented to consumers in the West with shallow references to 
their original cultural settings. Herman’s argument is similarly presented in 
comparison with what he deems as “erroneous” labeling of “Jewish  mysticism,” 
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“Buddhist mysticism” and “Islamic mysticism” (166). Herman argues that since 
this is genealogically a Christian concept, it is inherently wrong to attribute it 
to practices or philosophies in other religions. If that is so, then most of our 
analytical categories go with the spiritual bathwater. “Religion,” “the sacred,” 
“god,” “Hinduism,” “sacrifice” and “canon” are all categories mainly, but not 
exclusively, used and historically developed within Western cultures. Post-
colonialist or post-structuralist critics, including McCutcheon, have also tar-
geted most of them. One may wonder why “spirituality” has not got the same 
post-colonial attention. My hypothesis is that since its detachment from 
Christian discourses in 18-19th century France, it has to a larger extent been 
used by non-Westerns to translate certain concepts from other languages. At 
least, this seems to be the case today. Ironically, when criticizing the misat-
tribution of “spirituality” to non-Western contexts, one ignores the wealth of 
non-Western actors who choose to use this term themselves. When a guru in 
India chooses to attribute his wisdom as “spiritual,” has he brought the cat-
egory into a context where it does not apply?
The third problem pointed out by Herman is that it is “more often than not, an 
expression of unalloyed narcissism” (167). Again, how does Herman know this 
when he explicitly states that he has not done a genealogical study, nor a con-
tent analysis of the extensive literature that uses this category? Furthermore, 
how is “narcissism” employed as a methodological quality of analytical catego-
ries? Is “religious” less narcissistic, and by which criteria? Has Herman perhaps 
observed a correlation between the personality traits of those who use the 
category and those who does not? Where is the data? Beyond my misgivings 
with Herman’s missing methodology, is deeming the narcissism of categories 
a fruitful endeavor in the study of religion at all? Or can such work, which fails 
to engage relevant methods, data and literature, itself be redescribed and recti-
fied as an instance of “narcissism”?
V Missing the Irony
I am certain that Herman’s comparison of spirituality/religion and vagina/
penis will raise some eyebrows, either in provocation or amusement, but it 
remains unclear to which scholarly end it moves us. The penis/religion & 
vagina/spiritual comparison is presented as “ironic” and “imaginative” in the 
abstract, but not really in the article text itself. In this section, Herman does 
declare his methodological approach in the comparison that follows: “this 
discussion makes no pretenses about ‘real’ differences between religion and 
spirituality; nor does this advance any claims that constructions of religion 
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and spirituality and constructions of gender or sexual organs reflect similar 
social or cultural processes” (174). It is rather, “taking imaginative steps to illu-
minate certain idiosyncratic binary contrivances that are evoked in ‘spiritual’ 
rhetoric” (174). We must now assume that the “rhetoric“ he refers to, belongs to 
the numerous theologians referred to earlier. Though, the dichotomy between 
religion and spiritual(ity) is not entertained by most of these authors. Hence, 
Herman’s “rhetoric” cannot refer to that of these authors. Herman also makes 
reference to “the semantic field for ‘spirituality’ ” (172), but also without being 
specific to the context where this field is to be found. We are left to imagine on 
what and to where Herman’s imaginative steps are made.
Beyond the matter-of-factly presentation of the human genetalia and their 
“physical appearance and location, social dynamics, and ethical implica-
tions” (159), the heuristic value of this discussion seems to be a bit out of sync 
with how these things are perceived within the humanities. First of all—and 
Herman even mentions this in passing (174)—the representations of penises 
and vaginas are subject to cultural values and ideologies. Even within religious 
traditions they are portrayed in different ways, textures, materials, and func-
tions. A yoni is not “soft” and “introvert,” but rather made of stone and figures 
rather prominently within the ritual space. I cannot even criticize Herman 
for a Western ethnocentrism, for while his description of the penis as overt 
makes physiological sense, it does not fit in Western popular culture where 
it is more often than not censored, forbidden and hidden from view. These 
contradictory observations aside, why genitalia and not something else? What 
exactly does the alleged penis/vagina distinction reveal about the categories 
“religion”/“spiritual”? Does it make it easier to communicate? Does it identify 
new areas of thought, from where these phenomena should be researched? 
How far does this comparison extend? Further, it is not clear if Herman deploys 
the penis/vagina distinction as an analogy or homology. The first would sug-
gest that it is a rhetorical device, to prove a point—which still is somewhat 
vague to me. If it were the latter, Herman would need to explain the underlying 
principles that lead to this conclusion.
As much as Herman seems to allude to Jonathan Z. Smith, he does not 
follow through with the necessary “e.g.”-s to exemplify his generalizations of 
religion/spirituality and penis/vagina. The whole section is full of unqualified 
matter-of-factly statements. It is unclear on what level of abstraction or for 
whom these generalizations are made. In lieu of Herman’s own  methodological 
negations and the few included references, it cannot be generalized to the lit-
erature or scholarly work that mentions “spirituality,” nor to the history or con-
temporary use of the term, and not to speak of the scholarly attempts to define 
or conceptualize it. While Herman writes himself into the study of religion as 
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datum for “spirituality,” I cannot see how his article contributes to its status as 
a scholarly category.
VI Conclusion
The final irony is that I find myself in overall agreement with Herman’s 
conclusion (except the parts I have just refuted). He is correct in asserting 
that “spirituality” is “an important data point in the study of religion,” that 
it is a “relatively recent coinage with a distinct historical lineage, and it proj-
ects a cluster of liberal religious values and implicitly disparages more tradi-
tional ones” (179). His call for “examining questions of definition, analyzing 
the lexicon, and offering a redescriptive metaphor” is warranted. As I have 
shown in this article, this examination is already underway, however scarcely, 
within the study of religion. What we need, however, is neither irony nor 
imaginations. We need to gather relevant data with solid methodologies. 
If we want to be less vague, biased and erroneous when it comes to the use 
of “spirituality,” we do not need to hide behind “provocative manner[s],” we 
just need to do what the author of Imagining Religion recommends: “. . . be 
relentlessly self-conscious” and “articulate why ‘this’ rather than ‘that’ ” 
(Smith 1981: xi).
References
Ahlin, Lars (2008). The meaning of “spirituality”: A discussion with its starting point in 
an investigation among alternative therapists. Implicit Religion 11(1): 25-38.
Bregman, Lucy (2006). Spirituality: A glowing and useful term in search of a meaning. 
OMEGA: Journal of Death and Dying 53(1-2): 5-26.
Carrette, Jeremy R., and Richard King (2005). Selling Spirituality: The Silent Takeover of 
Religion. London: Routledge.
Dubuisson, Daniel (2003). The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and 
Ideology. Trans. William Sayers. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Eliade, Mircea (1971). Spirit, light, and seed. History of Religions 11(1): 1-30.
Fitzgerald, Timothy (1999). The Ideology of Religious Studies. Oxford University Press.
François, Alexandre (2008). Semantic maps and the typology of colexication. In 
M. Vanhove (ed.), From Polysemy To Semantic Change: Towards A Typology Of Lexical 
Semantic Associations, 163-215. John Benjamins Publishing.
Heelas, Paul, and Linda Woodhead (1995). The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion Is 
Giving Way to Spirituality. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publ.
14 doi 10.1163/15700682-12341350 | Melvær
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion (2015) 1-14
Herman, Jonathan R. (2014). The spiritual illusion. Method & Theory in the Study of 
Religion 26(2): 159-82.
Keller, B., Klein, C., & Swhajor-Biesemann, A. (2013). The semantics of “spirituality” and 
related self-identifications: a comparative study in Germany and the USA. Archive 
for the Psychology of Religion 35: 71-100.
Koenig, H.G. (2008). Concerns about measuring “spirituality” in research. The Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Disease 196 (5): 349-355. la Cour, P., N.H. Ausker, and 
N.C. Hvidt (2012). Six understandings of the word spirituality in a secular country. 
Archive for the Psychology of Religion 43: 63-81.
Løøv, Margrethe, and Knut Melvær (2014). Spirituell, religiøs eller åndelig?. DIN: 
Tidsskrift for religion og kultur 1: 113-33.
Principe, Walter (1983). Toward defining spirituality. Studies in Religion/Sciences 
Religieuses 12(2): 127-41.
Rose, Stuart (2001). Is the term ‘spirituality’ a word that everyone uses, but nobody 
knows what anyone means by it?. Journal of Contemporary Religion 16 (2): 193-207.
Schlehofer, M.M., and A.M. Omoto (2008). How do “religion” and “spirituality” differ? 
Lay definitions among older adults. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 47(3): 
411-25.
Sheldrake, Philip (2007). A Brief History of Spirituality. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell 
Publishing.
Smith, Jonathan Z. (1982). Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown. University of 
Chicago Press.
Tinsley, Lucy (1953). The French Expressions for Spirituality and Devotion. Catholic 
University of America Studies in Romance Languages and Literatures. New York,: 
AMS Press.
Voas, David, and Steve Bruce (2007). The spiritual revolution: Another false dawn for 
the sacred. In Flanagan, K. & Jupp, P.C. (eds.), A Sociology of Spirituality, 43-61. 
Ashgate.
Webster, David (2012). Dispirited: How Contemporary Spirituality Makes Us Stupid, 
Selfish and Unhappy. Zero Books.
Westerink, H. (2012). Spirituality in psychology of religion: A concept in search of its 
meaning. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 34: 1-13.
Wiebe, Donald (ed.) (2010). Religion: A human phenomenon. Conference proceedings 
for the XXth World Congress of the International Association of the History of Religions. 
University of Toronto.
Zinnbauer, Brian J., Kenneth I. Pargament, and Allie B. Scott (1999). The emerging 
meanings of religiousness and spirituality: Problems and prospects. Journal of 
Personality 67(6): 889-919.
